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Abstract
In 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union, a decision widely
known as ‘Brexit’. This analysis compares two competing theories – institution and identity – to
explain why. Four historical events, chronologically ordered from 1945 to 2016, are examined
with both identity and institution analysis to explain British integration and its subsequent
withdrawal from the European Union. Through this analysis, one can conclude the United
Kingdom’s decision to withdraw in 2016 stemmed from a variety of reasons, but each of these
can be explained by identity (a sense of nationalism), or institution (EU relationships).
Nationalism around the world has increased exponentially in recent years, evolving from
small grassroots factions into major political parties. This ideology has formed a sense of identity
in the United Kingdom that differs from EU governance. British pride and disassociation from a
European identity have also caused sociological differences that sparked and energized the
Brexit movement.
The relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union is complex. The
United Kingdom was never institutionalized with other member states to possess the same
values, norms, or legal system, and historically, they have shown diverging interests and a rocky
relationship.

Key Words:
Brexit, United Kingdom, Europe, European Union, European Integration, Global Studies, Political
Science, Nationalism, Euro, International Relations, History, Institutions, Sociology
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Introduction
“The world is not the most pleasant place. Eventually, your parents leave you and nobody is
going to go out of their way to protect you unconditionally. You need to learn to stand up for
yourself and what you believe in and sometimes, pardon my language, kick some ass.”
-Queen Elizabeth II1
June of 2016 changed the entire world as we know it. The United Kingdom’s decision to
leave the European Union sparked arguably the most significant series of events to happen in
Europe since the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1991. The vote to leave sent shockwaves throughout
the continent that reverberated around the world. Many believe the British vote to leave signaled
the kiss of death on the European Union as we know it, while others believe it marks the
beginning of the end of the United Kingdom’s reign as a strong world power. For years, the
relationship between the United Kingdom and the European Union has been rocky and the
British decision to leave was just another example of this.
To fully understand the United Kingdom’s (UK’s2) complex relationship with the
European Union,3 it is crucial to understand the process of European integration and a bit about
the European Union itself. European integration has been traditionally understood as the struggle
between national sovereignty and pan-European supranational governance.4 Optimists see the
EU’s conception and integration as a progressive step toward a more homogenous Europe.
Pessimists, also called Euroskeptics, believe economic issues and enduring national rivalries
cannot be solved with cooperation and integration.

1

Ghosh, “Queen Elizabeth II’s Memorable Quotes On Monarch’s 91st Birthday.”
United Kingdom, UK, British, and Britain are used interchangeably herein.
3
European Union, EU, EC, and EEC all refer to the governing European intergovernmental organization and change
depending on the time and date mentioned.
4
Rosamond, “Globalisation and the European Union.”
2
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Both optimistic and pessimistic views of the EU are prevalent around Europe. Opinions
surrounding the merits of European integration vary greatly depending on the issue, the point in
time, and the individual. There is a large gap between those in the United Kingdom who favor
European Union membership versus those who prefer sovereignty. The purpose of this paper is
to understand this dichotomy and how it ultimately led to withdrawal.
To understand the British views regarding EU membership, it is necessary to examine the
European Union itself. Following a discussion about European integration, this paper will
examine both optimistic and pessimistic points of view regarding the European Union. British
identity and European institutionalism are used to analyze the relationship over four periods in
time. These chapters highlight pinnacle moments when identity and institutionalism have come
to a head. They include 1. The UK joining the European Union in 1975, 2. The decision to keep
the pound sterling in 2003, 3. Evolving national security policies post-2005, and finally 4. The
2016 Brexit referendum.
A Brief History of European Integration
“The formation of the European Union is one of the most peculiar events in world history…”
-Engin Erdem, 2006
Intergovernmental organizations (IGO’s), like the United Nations, World Trade
Organization, and NATO, are a feature of daily life in many regions, but nowhere more so than
modern day Europe.5 The levels of integration in Europe, pooling together sovereignty and
uniting political communities, soar above all other international institutions. No other set of
nations around the world has been able to emulate the model the Europeans developed. The
European Union has overall succeeded in bringing peace, prosperity, and democracy to Europe
for almost 70 years.

5

Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.”
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In the 1950s, the Cold War dominated the east and west. Even so, Europeans from all
nations sought comradery. Nations hoped to end the decades of bloody wars that plagued Europe
with newfound cooperation. The first step taken was to integrate the European Coal and Steel
Communities (ECSC). Six founding countries met in 1951 and established the Treaty of Paris to
integrate the coal and steel industries in Western Europe. The original members were France,
West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.6 The United Kingdom was
invited to participate in the ECSC but did not sign the treaty because “they disliked many of the
supranational and technocratic elements of the treaty.”7
The British decision to opt out of the ECSC was not unanimous. In 1945, years before the
ECSC was even created, Britain’s Foreign Secretary Ernest Bevin expressed a desire to resurrect
Britain’s preeminent international standing.8 With Japan on the brink of surrendering World War
II and the British Labour Party (LP) freshly in power,9 Bevin and the Foreign Office discussed
the idea of a more integrated Europe. He outlined a grand design to build political, military, and
economic cooperation with Europe.10 “It might seem that Britain was ready in 1945 to undertake
the close commitment to the continent in peacetime from which she had historically shrunk,”
Professor of Politics at the University of Leicester John Young said.11 However, the results
weren’t nearly as productive as Bevin had hoped, proven by Britain’s deviance from the ECSC
in 1951.
Shortly after the ECSC was created, the Treaties of Rome (1957) established the
European Economic Community (EEC). The EEC was an association designed to integrate not

6

“European Coal and Steel Community.”
“Why Did the United Kingdom Not Join the European Union When It Started? - UK in a Changing Europe
8
Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92.
9
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only coal and steel in Europe, but the economies too. Britain, just as they did with the ECSC,
declined membership in the EEC. “Britain, since 1945, has repeatedly distanced itself from
efforts to create supranational institutions in Europe. Instead, the country based its political and
economic future, in the international sphere, on the American alliance and the EmpireCommonwealth.” 12
At the turn of the century, the economy in the UK struggled in comparison to the rest of
Europe. “In retrospect, the failure to fulfill Bevin’s grand design of August 1945 seemed to point
major errors of judgment by British policymakers,” Young said.13 It was Conservative Prime
Minister Harold Macmillan who, in an attempt to repair the suffering British economy, decided
the UK needed to join the EEC in 1961.14 After a tumultuous and lengthy admissions process
that is discussed later in this paper, the United Kingdom, along with Denmark and Ireland, were
approved to join the EEC in 1973. The acceptance of these states raised the total number of EEC
members to nine.
Shortly before the UK’s admission, the six original states stopped charging customs fees
in trade with one other and agreed on joint control over food production.15 This boosted their
economies greatly. However, the monetary boost didn’t last long, as energy and economic crises
flooded Europe as a result of the brutal Arab-Israeli war. The EEC leaders championed the idea
of upholding the economies and strengths of all European states, even non-members. Thus, as
dictatorships in nations like Portugal and Spain came to a head, European Parliament, the
governing body of the EEC, began transferring huge sums of money and infrastructure to these
lower-income states.16

12

Young.
Young.
14
Ludlow et al., “When Britain First Applied to Join the EU.”
15
Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92.
16
Rosamond, “Globalisation and the European Union.”
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The economy in Europe fluctuated greatly throughout the 1970s, but real concrete change
developed in the 1980s. The EU first started looking east, when the Polish trade union gained
attention following the Gdansk shipyard strikes during the summer of 1980.17 In 1981, Greece
became the 10th member of the EU and in 1986, Spain and Portugal became the 11th and 12th
members, respectively.18 That same year, the Single European Act (SEA, 1986) was signed
creating the European Single Market. The Single Market offered a solution to the onerous trade
conditions that existed across borders by guaranteeing the free movement of goods, capital,
services, and labor throughout member states.19
In 1989, the Berlin Wall was torn down and the border between East and West Germany
opened for the first time in 28 years.20 The fall of the wall led to the reunification of Germany
and brought an end to communism in Europe. “After the Berlin Wall came down, I visited that
city and I will never forget it. The abandoned checkpoints. The sense of excitement about the
future. The knowledge that a great continent was coming together. Healing those wounds of our
history is the central story of the European Union.” British Prime Minister David Cameron said
in a speech to the EU in 2013.21
The 1990s were equally progressive. “In the early 1990s, organizations such as the
Council of Europe (CE) and the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE)
moved quickly to expand.” Jeremy Checkel, International Studies Professor, said.22 In December
1991, EEC leaders met in Maastricht, Netherlands, to discuss greater European cooperation on

17

“Gdansk Shipyard Strike Launched a Revolution.”
Anonymous, “The 28 Member Countries of the EU.”
19
Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92.
20
Smith, “How 1989 Changed the History of European Integration.”
21
“David Cameron’s EU Speech - Full Text.”
22
Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.”
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all levels.23 The main result of this conference was the Maastricht Treaty. The treaty officially
created the European Union (EU), as the EEC which incorporated and renamed. It also granted
EU citizenship to citizens of all member states, enabling people to vote and run for office in
European Parliament elections. The treaty also provided the introduction of the Euro, a universal
currency. The Maastricht treaty resulted in greater cooperation regarding the environment,
policing, the economy, and all social policies in European member states.
In 1995, the newly re-branded European Union gained three more members: Austria,
Finland, and Sweden.24 That same year, Schengen, a small town in Luxembourg, created the
Schengen Agreements. These agreements allowed EU citizenry to travel across the border in
Luxembourg freely and without a passport check.25 Four years later, the Treaty of Amsterdam
was signed, officially incorporating Luxembourg’s Schengen agreements allowing for free travel
across all member states. This treaty also gave European Parliament stronger powers and
increased general provisions on member states. With borders broken down by the Schengen
Zone and the rapid increase of technology, communication and interconnectedness increased
exponentially.
The early 21st century in the European Union was marked by EU expansion to the east.
Ten new countries attained EU membership in 2004. In 2007, two more were added, bringing
the total number to 27.26 More member states decided to adopt the Euro as well, and it quickly
became the primary currency for most Europeans.27 The United Kingdom was a rare exception they voted to retain the pound sterling in 2003. The September 11th, 2001, attacks in the United

24

Europa, “The 28 Member Countries of the EU.”
“Schengen.”
26
Europa, “The 28 Member Countries of the EU.”
27
Alesina and Giavazzi, Europe and the Euro.
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States launched a global war on terror and led to increased security cooperation in the EU.
Member states began to work together more heavily to fight crime and terrorism.
In 2008, a financial crisis rocked the global economy and plummeted Europe into its
deepest recession since the 1930s.28 Several countries experienced the collapse of financial
institutions, high government debt, and rapidly rising bond yields. The collapse of Iceland’s
banking system was the first calamity, but similar circumstances quickly spread to Portugal,
Italy, Ireland, Greece, and Spain.29
In 2009, the Treaty of Lisbon amended the Maastricht Treaty and other integrating
documents, increasing the EU’s governing authority.30 The Treaty of Lisbon was initially met
with immense opposition and even put to a referendum in Ireland. Ireland’s public vote actually
rejected the Treaty, jeopardizing the entire document. However, Ireland held a second
referendum in 2009, voting this time in favor of the Treaty. Once Ireland was on board, other
hesitant countries followed and the proposed Treaty was eventually ratified.
The Lisbon Treaty included an important clause, Article 50. This clause was given little
public attention at the time, due to the economic crises, but became important in 2010 and 2016.
Article 50 outlines the provisions under which a country can leave the EU.31
In 2010, Article 50 was considered as the Greek economy spiraled out control. EU
leaders addressed the possibility of a “Grexit” (“Greek exit”) from the Eurozone and the EU.
However, Article 50 only addresses a country’s voluntary separation from the EU, not terms
under which a member state might be expelled.32 Ultimately, Greece reached an agreement with
its creditors and solved its immediate crisis and the Article 50 discussion stopped.
28

Kenton, “European Sovereign Debt Crisis Definition.”
Kenton.
30
Young, Britain and European Unity, 1945-92.
31
Rosamond, “Globalisation and the European Union.”
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The Greek economic downturn was just one of the serious challenges to fall upon the EU
during this decade. The EU had to help several countries, in addition to Greece, with their
economies. As a result, the EU established a banking union to create safer and more reliable
banks. “As the financial crisis evolved into the euro area debt crisis, it became clear that deeper
integration of the banking system was needed for the Euro area countries, which are particularly
interdependent.” the European Commission said.33 The banking union ensures EU banks are
stronger and better supervised to prevent future crises.
Though the economy was poor in most of the member states, the European Union was
awarded the Nobel Peace Prize in 2012, “For over six decades contributed to the advancement of
peace and reconciliation, democracy, and human rights in Europe.”34 This award showed that the
success of the European Union was less about the economy, and more about political
cooperation. In 2013, Croatia became the 28th member state, making it the most recent member
to join the EU. Simultaneous to their admission, the EU began heavily prioritizing climate
change. Though the economy was still poor, the political side of the EU was thriving.
2014 proposed new challenges to the EU’s political harmony. The first challenge
occurred when Russia forcibly annexed the Ukrainian Republic of Crimea. The EU responded, in
partnership with the United States, Canada, and other allies, with economic sanctions on Russia.
These sanctions restricted western financial/service markets designated for Russian enterprises
and placed embargos on Russian exports.35 The actions signaled unity amongst members of the
EU, but it adversely affected their economies. The sanctions in Russia caused a massive loss in

33

European Commission, “What Is the Banking Union?”
“The Nobel Peace Prize 2012.”
35
Review, “Sanctions after Crimea.”
34
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export opportunities, as it forced Russia into a recession which drove down the number of goods
and services being sold to Russians.36
Around the same time, the EU began dealing with immense unrest in the Middle East.
More than 1 million migrants arrived in Europe in 2016 after the Russian bombing escalated
Syria’s civil war.37 Under the 1951 UN Refugee Convention, those escaping war or persecution
are protected and can’t be turned away.38 The massive influx of migrants stirred fear in locals
and created divisions among the EU nations. The threat of Islamic terrorism was correlated to
the migrant crisis, and nationalist-leaning politicians fanned concerns over the refugees.39 This
political attention caused many European citizens to fear Middle Eastern migrants and refugees.
Also, in 2014, European Parliamentary elections were held. The poor economy, the
struggling relationship with Russia, and the migrant crisis caused public opinion to shift more
toward the negative aspects of the EU. Euroskeptic political parties from all states, especially the
UK, campaigned for a vote against the EU in the Parliamentary election. Multiple Euroskeptics
were elected to the European Parliament, creating a split government regarding the value of the
European Union.40
This brings us to today. The European Union has evolved into a diverse body with a
complex framework that includes multiple governing bodies, such as the Council, Parliament,
Court, and Commission. The power of these branches has varied over time, but the EU
Parliament and Court are seen as increasingly powerful institutions. “The increasing power of

36

Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.”
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38
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39
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40
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European level supranational institutions such as the European Court of Justice demonstrates that
it has gone beyond nation states.” political scientist Engin Erdem said.41
Membership in the European Union today varies from state to state. While the European
Union employs common rules and regulations, its continued power is because it recognizes
states’ differences. Each state has unique needs, economic strengths and weaknesses, priorities,
and norms. Each state also has an independent history, that constructed their nation and
government, and an independent reason why they chose to integrate.
Attempts to generalize integration rationale on a large scale or even regional basis are
relatively meaningless. “In essence, scholars might have been attempting to generate common
theories out of radically distinct dependent variables. That is, they might actually be trying to
explain different things,” said Ben Rosamund, Professor at the University of Copenhagen.42
Accordingly, this paper will therefore focus only on the United Kingdom and its
relationship with the European Union. The UK decided to leave an economic and political
partnership with 27 European countries, as well as a formidable security coalition fighting
terrorism, organized crime, and cybercrime. They are leaving an organization with a
comprehensive migration policy that accepted an influx of refugees, and they are the first EU
nation to vote to leave.
Theoretical Analysis
With strong benefits for membership on the table and no precedent for disintegration,
many wonder why the UK voted to leave. This is exactly the question I analyze in this paper. I
argue that the UK has been fighting a war between identity and institution since its genesis. The
identity side values British congruence, nationalism, and state pride. The institutional side

41
42

Erdem, “European Integration and International Relations Theory.”
Rosamond, “Brexit and the Problem of European Disintegration.”
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emphasizes the importance of cooperation with Europe. In this section, I will discuss the United
Kingdom’s two sides through a theoretical analysis comparing and contrasting institutions and
identity.
Institutions
“Beyond differences and geographical boundaries, there lies a common interest.”
– Jean Monnet, French economist and diplomat.43
Hospitals, schools, religious groups, political systems, the court system, mass media, and
militaries. These are just a few examples of institutions that uphold our global society today.
Institutions all over the world invest in physical and human capital, provide us with new
technologies and research, mobilize governments and businesses, and so much more. Institutions
are a vastly important part of our society and institutionalism is a theory that attempts to explain
their role.
The study of institutionalism covers a wide realm. Institutionalism draws from previous
work in a wide array of disciplines, including economics, political science, sociology,
anthropology, and psychology. It is frequently categorized by the attention it gives to history as
well; Oftentimes the two are lumped together in what is known as historical institutionalism. 44 A
full overview of institutionalist theory would require going all the way back to back to Aristotle,
but this ancient theory of institutionalism barely scratched the surface of its modern role.
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, institutionalism appeared in American scholarship
for the first time. American economist and sociologist Thorstein Veblen criticized the ancient
philosophers’ approach for its focus on individual people, as opposed to the institution or society
itself. Veblen argued that the cause and effect should be flipped - individuals are shaped by their

43
44

“A Quote by Jean Monnet.”
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institutional and sociocultural context, not the other way around. His theory relies on the fact that
institutions produce order, and this order creates expectation. Individuals orient their behavior
accordingly.45
In the mid-20th Century, an anthropological version of institutionalism emerged through
the work of Austro-Hungarian scholar Karl Polanyi. Polanyi defined institutions as uniting,
stabilizing, and structure-giving.46 He also stressed the importance of noneconomic institutions,
such as religion. His perception of institutions foreshadowed an additional branch of
institutionalism soon to come - sociological institutionalism.
Polanyi’s work also pushed institutionalism to appear more in political science. Theorists
like American Carl Friedrich began combining institutionalist theory with constitutionalism and
democracy. For Friedrich, this intersect was characterized by a concern for individual autonomy
and institutional arrangements.47 Friedrich was careful to note that institutions must reflect
social and political reality, as without legitimacy, they are greatly weakened.
Around the time Friedrich was studying institutionalism and democracy in the United
States, the ECSC developed, creating a never-before-seen international institution in Europe. The
ECSC, which eventually became the EU, has fostered economic growth, fair trade, employment,
stability, and prosperity in Europe for decades. The institution promotes security, protects
citizens, and makes travel easier. Many argue without the EU, European countries could never be
the global force that they are today.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the United Kingdom’s relationship with the
European Union. Given the EU is an institution itself, institutionalism a crucial theory for
integration analysis. There are two types of institutionalism relevant to the UK’s membership –

45
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47
“Institutionalism | Social Science.”
46

14

sociological and historical. These two perspectives explain why 1. Certain British citizens favor
the EU institution, and 2. How perspectives change over time.
First, sociological institutionalism is the process of inducting actors into the norms and
rules of a given community.48 Sociological institutionalists see human behavior as a moldable,
meaning our social surroundings and institutions create identities.49 Oftentimes, institutions have
a social structure in which shared norms and rules play a considerable role, and therefore,
similarities are promoted amongst members. Jeremey Checkel, a professor of international law,
notes that these socializing effects are often uneven and surprisingly weak. “In no way can
(sociological institutionalism) be construed as shaping a new, post-national identity.” He says. 50
Second, historical institutionalism looks at when a shift occurs and how.51 Historical
institutionalists believe institutions, both formal and informal, evolve over time and guide the
behavior of political actors in the policy-making process accordingly.52 Institutions do not
perform with perfect efficiency and institutional rules are slow to change. Those factors must be
considered in any institutional membership analysis.53 Historical institutionalism seeks to define
and explain real-world political outcomes using the historical legacy of institutional structures
and feedbacks available.54 It also puts the will of nation-states at the center of institutional
development and looks at the shifts in institutional rules, constraints, and the responses to them
over time.

48
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The desire to join the European Union demonstrates one places greater importance upon
cooperation and the success of the whole rather than independence and sovereignty. This twopart theoretical diversity assessing sociological institutionalism and historical institutionalism is
utilized to assess the British – EU relationship because it provides the fullest picture.
Sociological institutionalism highlights the differences between the UK and mainland Europe,
while historical institutionalism documents the changes over time in the relationship between the
UK and the EU and incorporates other factors, such as economic crises, security issues,
immigration debates, and more.
The EU has become a major force in Europe, making institutionalism a necessary theory
to analyze when studying British integration and withdrawal from the institution. The benefits of
integration have sold many British citizens on the EU, yet there a large percentage in the United
Kingdom prioritizes values less congruent with institutionalism, like nationalism.
Identity
“In my lifetime, all our problems have come from mainland Europe and all the
solutions have come from the English-speaking nations across the world.”
– Margaret Thatcher, Speech to Scottish Tories, 1999. 55
Nationalist factions began gaining traction all around the world in recent years, from the
United States to China to the United Kingdom. Generically, nationalism is an ideology based on
the premise that an individual’s loyalty and devotion to his or her nation-state surpasses other
individual or group interests.56 Historian Liah Greenfield dates this ideology back to sixteenthcentury England and the Protestant Reformation.57 The Protestant Reformation put an end to an
integrated world, previously unified by Catholicism and the Holy Roman Empire.

55
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When nationalism was first recognized after the Protestant Reformation, the principle
was generally that each nationality should form its own state and that state should include all
members of said ethnicity. Religious differences, political conflicts, and competitive spirit pitted
nation against nation and individuality replaced the universal consciousness that previously
united citizens.
Nationalism is valued in the UK and its source of identity comes from the top down. In
2007 Prime Minister Gordon Brown published an article with Secretary of State Jack Straw
called The Governance of Britain. One part of this paper, titled “Britain’s Future: The Citizen
and The State”, focused on what it means to be British and what British values are.58 This article
was filled with nationalist ideals. Nationalist beliefs in the UK also comes from the mass media BBC did an entire radio show called ‘Britishness’, in which they discussed how to increase
British patriotism in schools.59
In 1992, Linda Colly published a book called ‘Britons: Forging the Nation, 1707 to
1837’ analyzing how the four states that make up the present-day United Kingdom came
together. 60 The individual states that compose the United Kingdom-Wales, England, Northern
Ireland, and Scotland - joined one another as a common nation in 1707. Their unification
propelled the nation, as the stock market matured, the navy grew, and insurance developed.
“Through their empire and trading opportunities that came with it, with a common commitment
to Protestantism, by a monarchy at the apex of an increasingly interconnected ruling class and
reinforced by wars against Continental Europe (and especially Catholic France), British
distinctiveness was clearly defined,” Colly said.61

58
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After the countries united, money became a huge factor that heightened nationalism as
well. The collective British government started selling bonds to citizens. A citizen could loan
the government money, and eventually, they would get their money back plus interest.62 With
this, citizens gained a monetary investment in the government. More than ever, citizens wanted
Britain to stabilize so they could get their investment back. Thus, politics became more tolerant,
as radical overthrows of the government or war meant citizens were less likely to see this return
on investment.63
The United Kingdom is unique, as it is one nation made up of four independent,
sovereign states. The marriage of Scotland, Wales, Northern Ireland, and England made
nationalism and identity complicated. “Why is it that one can talk of the Europeanization of
German national identity, but not British?” Checkel said.64
Unlike the term ‘French’ or ‘Dutch, the term ‘British’ encompasses those other identities
within it – Scottish, Welsh, English, and other local labels by city are common. The United
Kingdom was “an invented nation superimposed onto much older alignments in loyalties.”
Colley said.65 In this respect, one might think the British would be more accepting of the
additional European identity, as their culture has always allowed for multiple, interchangeable
identities, but sociologist Richard Keily argues this isn’t the case. The British are unique in that
they are first and foremost British. Some Brits even go as far as saying they are not European.
This categorization of national identity is unique in the UK.
One of the most influential methodological tools for probing multiple identities, such as
British, Scottish, or European, are the so-called Moreno questions. Rather than asking
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Coltrain, “18th Century America.”
Coltrain.
64
Checkel, “International Institutions and Socialization in Europe.”
65
Pincus, “Review of Britons.”
63

18

respondents about a specific identity they associate with, they ask respondents to rank their
identities in a five-point hierarchy: Scottish66 not British; more Scottish than British, equally
Scottish and British; more British than Scottish; British, not Scottish.
In 2013, the Government Office of Science commissioned a project analyzing changing
identities in the UK with this test.67 The results showed that people identified with the four
territories of the UK far more than they identified with being British in general. Depending on
their home country, the highest ranked answers for the respondents consistently were ‘Welsh, not
British’, ‘Scottish, not British’, ‘English, not British’, or ‘Irish, not British’.68
Similar to the way they do not acknowledge British identity as much as their regional
identity, people in the UK are hesitant to acknowledge a European identity. The Government
Office of Science provides two pieces of evidence supporting this claim. In Table 169, we see the
proportion of people in the United Kingdom who claim ‘European’ as part of their identity.70
This chart shows that between 2003 and 2011, at most 16% of the British population claimed to
be European. Similar results have been traced back to the 1990s. “Feeling European is
apparently very much a minority identity in the UK – and one that shows no sign of becoming
more commonplace over time.”71
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Table 1 – Percentage of British Citizens that identify as European

European

2003

2004

2005

2006

2007

2008

2009

2010

2011

12%

11%

12%

16%

12%

14%

12%

11%

12%

The second piece of evidence provided by the Government Office for Science are results
from another Moreno type question. Table 272 analyzes how British citizens compare
‘Britishness’ versus ‘Europeanism’. These results demonstrate that in almost every year since
1997, less than 1/3 of the British population has acknowledged any European identity at all73,
and only a handful, less than 10% every year since 1997, indicate that European identity is more
important to them than their Britishness.74 Citizens in the United Kingdom who strongly identify
as European are rare.
Table 2 – Trends in European Identity versus British Identity using the Moreno Test
1997

1998

1999

2000

2001

2003

2004

2005

2010

British
only
British
and
European
European
and
British

57%

62%

67%

62%

62%

62%

55%

63%

70%

29%

27%

23%

27%

27%

28%

35%

31%

24%

3%

4%

3%

4%

3%

5%

5%

2%

2%

European
Only

6%

5%

3%

2%

2%

3%

2%

1%

2%

The Government Office of Science offers evidence that those who deny European
identity are less likely to feel that the UK’s membership in the EU is a ‘good thing’. This data is
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exhibited in Table 3.75 Even further, amongst that subset of the population, consistently higher
percentages are saying that it is more of a bad thing than a good thing. In contrast, amongst those
who acknowledge any amount of European identity, even a secondary identity76, far more say
Britain’s EU membership is a good thing.
Table 3 – Attitudes Towards UK membership in the EU by British/European Identity
% of Brits that say UK
membership is a…

British only identity

Acknowledge European
identity

Good Thing

23%

68%

Bad Thing

39%

7%

Good Thing

15%

45%

Bad Thing

30%

13%

Good Thing

20%

52%

Bad Thing

39%

16%

1995

2000

2005

In other EU nations, identity is claimed differently than in the UK. At least partially
identifying as European far more is commonplace. In their book, Revue Internationale de
Politique Comparée, scholars Alistair Cole and Jocelyn Evans use the Moreno test to explain
identity in France. Cole and Evans compare Wales and Brittany, a region in France. Application
of the Moreno Question in these two areas revealed that dual identity is more accepted in
Brittany than in Wales. Unlike in Wales, there were few conflicts with being both Breton and
75
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French or being both French and European.77 Cole and Evan’s results in 2007 greater prove The
Government Office of Science’s later analysis in 2013.
National identity, as proven through the Moreno Tests, is more important in the United
Kingdom than other European nations. As a result, international socialization for the UK has
been an uncertain and debated process. The UK has had a more difficult time integrating into
Europe than other EU states, as citizens are hesitant to accept traditions, rules, norms, or beliefs
other than their own. As this analysis dives deeper into case studies analyzing specific historical
events in the UK, one should keep in mind the high regard in which the British citizenry hold
their national identity.
Empirical Analysis
The rest of this paper focuses on four events in four different time periods, explained
chronologically. Departure from an International Governmental Organization (IGO78) is not
unique to the United Kingdom, though the UK is the first to leave an IGO as large the EU.79 As
previously stated, analysis of why a state decides to withdraw very much depends on the state
itself. Examining four points in time gives a full picture of the relationship between the UK and
the EU.
The case studies to follow are pinnacles in the British/European relationship. In these
events, one can see the relationship evolve and the ebbs and flows of nationalism in the UK – in
some cases, nationalism dominates the scene and we see the United Kingdom stray away from
EU policies and treaties. In other years, the United Kingdom puts nationalist beliefs to the side in
favor of international cooperation. Each of these events was chosen to further explore the
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relationship between identity and institution in the UK and tell us what preempted the 2016
decision to withdraw.
The first case study explains The United Kingdom’s journey to join the European Union.
While they officially joined in 1975, the debate began when the European Coal and Steel
Community formed in 1945. This section examines that 30-year period and the trials that came
with attaining membership.
The second case study spans only a few years, starting around 1999 and ending in 2003.
This section deals with the debate of whether or not the UK should keep the pound sterling or
transition to the euro, like the rest of Europe. The debate ultimately resulted in the nation
deciding to keep the pound.
The third case study deals with post-2005 national security policies in the United
Kingdom. In the 21st century, we really start to see the UK’s security policy and interests diverge
from the rest of Europe. This ten-year period is also really when the campaign to leave started to
build and take form.
Lastly, the fourth and final section deals the 2016 referendum itself. The 2016
Referendum was not as sudden as many think. In fact, years of controversy really led to the vote
which is why a case study analysis analyzing the British and European relationship over time is
necessary.
The case studies are each split into an overview, identity/institution analysis, and
correlation to Brexit80. The overview will provide necessary background information, while the
identity/institution analysis compares and contrasts two key views regarding EU membership.
The correlation to the 2016 referendum uses the case studies to draw connections between the
time period at hand and the decision to leave the EU. The purpose of these case studies is to
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understand British membership in the EU and analyze why the United Kingdom chose to
withdraw from the European Union.
1945-1975: The Journey to Join the European Union
“The cries of ‘shame’ stabbing through the cheers when the Prime Minister announced
we are asking for formal application to join the European Economic Community came
from both sides. So did the portentously eager applause when he insisted that we shall
not take the final step unless our Commonwealth and other obligations can be reconciled,
for otherwise, the ‘loss would be greater than the gain’.” – The Guardian, August 196181
Overview
The United Kingdom first applied for membership in the European Community in 1961.
At the time, proponents of membership were namely the motor industries, manufacturers,
newspapers, and big businesses, but their beliefs about the benefits of membership weren’t
shared by all. Many hated the idea of relying on the economies of their sister European states
and strongly opposed the application. “There is a great deal of kicking and screaming to be
expected.” the Guardian stated in August 1961.82
Applying for membership in the European Economic Community (EEC) faced backlash
not only from citizens in Britain but from the six-member states already in the EEC as well.
Those six included France, West Germany, Italy, Belgium, the Netherlands, and Luxembourg.
Since the UK had been offered membership previously,but declined in pursuit of an American
alliance, the motives for joining were deeply questioned. Prime Minister Macmillan filed the
documents in 1961, as the UK economy shifted into a severe recession, forcing him to retract
Britain’s initial denial. However, the process to join the EEC wasn’t nearly as simple as they
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thought. To be approved for membership, the six current members each needed to vote yes. Five
of the six states voted to approve the UK’s application immediately, but France hesitated. In fact,
French President Charles de Gaulle assessed Britain’s application for over a year before
ultimately voting no in 1963.
President de Gaulle explained his no vote by saying that certain British policies, such as
labor and agriculture, were incompatible with those of the EEC. He alluded to the fact that close
Anglo-American relations would lead the United States to start increasing its influence in
Europe, adding a western seat at the table that France could not accept. Along those same lines,
de Gaulle noted that the British economy, utilizing dollar diplomacy and the GATT (General
Agreement on Tariff and Trade) System, was too globalized for the EEC. Some even
hypothesized that de Gaulle also voted no as British membership had strong potential to weaken
the French voice within Europe. “For President de Gaulle, the main objection to an enlarged
community was that it might lead to an Atlantic community, dominated by the United States.”
the Guardian said in a January 1963 publication.83
After de Gaulle’s veto, the British waited four years and then reapplied for EEC
membership again. For the second time, Gaulle single-handedly blocked the application. Two
years after the second failed attempt, President de Gaulle retired. Without de Gaulle vetoing on
behalf of France, the United Kingdom hastily decided to try again for membership. New
Conservative Prime Minister Edward Heath submitted the necessary documents and the United
Kingdom was shortly thereafter approved for membership by all six voting nations. This
approval signaled the green light to begin negotiations for membership terms.
Negotiations with soon-to-be international allies commenced in 1969, but the UK still
faced a battle at home. The terms and conditions of membership were considered restrictive and
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displeased many Brits, but Heath urged Britain to accept the terms anyways and join the EEC.
Re-negotiations of specific terms could be handled after member status was achieved, he said.
“The community is, and needs to be, an evolving institution,” the Guardian wrote on January 1,
1973.84
British motives for membership continued to be questioned, particularly regarding the
question as to why the British were so persistent to join the EEC now when they had initially
declined. What changed from the early 1960s to 1970 was the strength of the British economy.
While the EEC economy was booming, the British were facing their worst recession since
WWII. Businesses were failing, inflation reached a record 27%, the pound was plummeting on
the exchange market, and the financial instability was causing workforce strikes. In 1972, UK
unemployment reached a record 1 million people and, to make matters even worse, miner strikes
over pay ensued causing electricity shortages across the country. After one month without the
miners working, the strike and recession forced Parliament to declare a national state of
emergency. The country was experiencing a crisis.
While the British were hesitant about the membership terms and conditions the EEC was
offering, more pressing economic matters overshadowed those concerns. The failing economy
caused citizens to worry more about feeding their families and keeping their jobs than EEC
membership. Thus, the terms were quietly accepted, and EEC membership was achieved.
The official date of entry into the EEC for the United Kingdom, along with Denmark and
Ireland, was January 1, 1973. The front page of The Guardian read “We’re in – but without the
fireworks.” The article went on to say “Britain passed peacefully into Europe at midnight last
night without any special celebrations. It was difficult to tell that anything of importance had
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occurred, and a date which will be entered in the history books as long as histories of Britain are
written was taken by most people as a matter of course.”85
The poor economy in the United Kingdom didn’t magically disappear as their acceptance
as a member state in the EEC was made official, however. In 1974, just as they had done two
years prior, the miners went on strike yet again. In response, Prime Minister Heath called an
emergency election to reaffirm the direction of the nation. However, he ended up losing that
election to the Labour Party candidate, Harold Wilson, who thus inherited a nation in shambles.
Wilson’s first order of business to get the country back on track was finding a way to get
all of the miners to return to work. Under his lead, unionizing gained traction, wages were
controlled, the government stopped printing money, and income policies were put into place to
prevent further economic crises. The British motorcar industry was nearly bankrupt, however,
compared to a thriving EEC motorcar industry. In hopes of getting the British economy on the
same level as the EEC, Wilson immediately called for renegotiations of the terms of Britain’s
membership. The negotiations lasted almost one year and led to some concessions from the
EEC, such as the establishment of the European Regional Development Fund,86 but changes
were minor overall.
On March 27, 1975, the Wilson Government recommended that the British electorate
approve the results of renegotiation. Two intense campaigns began aimed at influencing these
delegates. There was the Britain in Europe (BIE) movement, led by the Conservative Party and
their new leader, Margaret Thatcher, fighting for a ‘Yes’ vote to remain in the EEC. Campaigns
to restore independence, however, such as the National Referendum Campaign (NRC) were
equally active, fueled by a nostalgic view of the empire and accompanying desire for
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independence.87 Wilson ultimately decided to put the renegotiated contract to a referendum and
let the public decide.
Thus, on June 5, 1975, the United Kingdom held its first-ever national referendum
regarding European integration. A ‘Yes’ vote indicated a desire to remain in the EEC, while a
‘No’ vote signaled a desire to return to independence. The result came back 67.2% ‘Yes’, 32.8%
‘No’, determining the British would remain in the EEC for the time being.
June 5, 1975, therefore remains the de facto date for the UK joining the European
Community. According to the Guardian, “He [Prime Minister Wilson] celebrated it with a brief
statement declaring the formal end of the 14-year controversy over Europe and calling on the
anti-marketers to join wholeheartedly in working inside Europe to solve the economic crisis.”88
With that, the United Kingdom was in.
Identity & Institutions Analysis
The somewhat tortured journey to join the EEC is a prime example of an ongoing clash
between identity and institution in the UK. In the 1960s, the British nationalist point of view ran
alongside President de Gaulle. The nationalists capitalized on the delay that accompanied
Gaulle’s vetoes, forcing both European and British citizens to think critically about the UK’s
membership. Nationalists also used this extension to campaign further for British sovereignty.
Like Gaulle, they emphasized the normative and structural differences between the United
Kingdom and the EEC.
The UK was more westernized than the rest of the EEC, and by many accounts, they
were searching for a different kind of Europe than the EEC would provide. “For Britain to join
the kind of Europe which President de Gaulle wants would be unthinkable,” wrote the Guardian
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in 1961.89 Nationalists also pointed to the harsh membership terms and conditions Britain were
handed, with the official ‘No’ campaign warning of the risk to sovereignty, jobs, and food prices.
Their efforts, while strong, ultimately only resulted in a 32.8% vote for independence.
With 67.2% voting ‘Yes’, advocates for integration, championed by the government and
conservative opposition obtained the majority. The ‘Yes’ campaign surrounded a range of issues
from job security to world peace and the Commonwealth. However, those numbers were not
fully representative of European institutionalist beliefs, as the economic crisis forced many
nationalists to seek drastic changes. Those who previously valued patriotism over all else reacted
favorably to the possibility of mutual wins, jointly profitable arrangements, and the compromises
that came with the EEC membership because of their current situation. In the short term, citizens
believed the EEC would be able to stabilize the tumultuous British economy. In addition, the
EEC was seen as a necessary alliance for long-term peace, security, trade, and both regional and
international development.
The diverging opinions over integration clashed for the first time in the 1975 referendum.
Institutionalism and nationalism were embedded in society as opposing forces in 1961 and their
conflicting nature set the stage for many debates to come.
Correlation to Brexit
Though occurring roughly 50 years apart, the integration process in the 1960s and 70s
and the withdrawal process in the 21st century shared certain qualities. In both eras, British
opinion about Europe changed as British’s society evolved, the elite led the movement, selfinterested motives set the nation’s agenda, and the European question was at the head of the
debate. Each of these three points is further expanded upon below.
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First, the 1961 application for membership signaled a complete change in the UK’s then
current views about European integration. As previously stated, the UK was offered the chance
to be a founding member of the EEC but declined. Macmillan’s application for membership after
years of the UK’s disinterest was a symbol of this change. “The internal debate that preceded
Harold Macmillan’s decision to seek membership featured a cocktail of economic and political
motivations,” said London School of Economics Professor Piers Ludlow.90
It would seem that the change in opinion was primarily due to a change in civilization.
The poor economy was a major factor, but also many people reported that their increased desire
to integrate was fueled by inclusion anxiety.91 With the EEC was becoming a potent political
actor next door, Britain’s position as a world power was steeply declining with the erosion of
their empire. Stated simply, the British did not want to be left behind as the rest of the EEC
advanced.
In 2016, there was a similar change in opinion, but for different reasons. The EU’s status
as a major world power had faltered in the decade prior and various events, such as the election
of Donald Trump in the United States, sparked a sense of nationalism around the world.
Patriotic attitudes developed, and similar to the inclusion anxiety the British felt when the EEC
launched, a desire for solitude and self-control swept over the country.
A second shared feature of perspectives in the two eras is that in both 1975 and 2016 the
British elite led the movement to effectuate the change. For the elite in 1975, the prospect of
being able to steer Europe from within had its appeal, as the British at the time were stuck in a
cycle of repeated failure attempting to influence the world and Europe from afar. When the elite
got on board, much of the country followed. Likewise, in the 21st century, when the upper-class
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citizens shifted their focus homeward and on national issues, others followed suit with the same
sense of patriotism.
The third parallel drawn here between the 1960s and 2016 is that the applications for
membership and for withdrawal caused the UK to develop a list of needs. Primarily, the list was
filled with short-term, immediate crises that needed attention. Britain applied for membership
namely to address these short-term needs and to stabilize their economy and regain their status as
a world power. Once the UK’s short-term needs were met, EEC membership was no longer
necessary and many to returned to their former patriotic emphasis.
Historical institutionalist theory can also help correlate the initial years of integration and
the later years of disintegration as well. In the initial years, British citizens learned about the
realities of community enlargement. Being shut down by Gaulle forced the British citizens to
learn first-hand how change in the EEC is slow and painful, they adhere to strict rules that each
applicant must conform to. Many of the agreements and treaties in place within the community
since the beginning have been painstakingly stitched together and cannot simply be undone.
Thus, it quickly became clear in negotiations that these talks were not between equals – the EEC
ran the show in 1973 and they would be making the ultimate decision regarding Britain’s terms
of membership. “Instead, it was a process where Britain had to demonstrate how they would
adapt to the community system.”92 Following the vote to leave the EU in 2016, the British faced
the same circumstance. Negotiations between Prime Minister Theresa May and the European
Union Council regarding the divorce have been slow and painful. The EU has conceded to few
of the British demands.
Lastly, the two time periods share the battle of identity versus institution. The European
question has been divisive for the UK since the EEC was created. It was in the 1960s ‘Europe’
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became a hot button term in the UK, forcing people to choose between neighborly cooperation
individual strength. This question divided the Conservative and Labour parties and split almost
all of the elite groups in the country - civil service, academia, government leaders, etc. The
debate regarding British membership in the EU, while a hot current event, has existed for
decades.
Since integrating with Europe, much of its allure has faded for the UK. The idea of
Europe as an area of booming economic growth subsided. In fact, Europe’s economy isn’t
known for its dynamism any more, but more for its fragility. History has changed both the UK
and the EU structurally and culturally, but even through the changes, the concept of identity in
the UK has remained the same. The conflict between this identity and institution may have had
its latest battle in 2016, but the first encounter provided its beginnings in 1961.
2003: The United Kingdom votes to keep the Pound Sterling
“Integration is the most important asset Europe has, and the key component to European
integration is the Euro.” – Anibal Cavaco Silva, 19th President of Portugal93
Overview
On January 1, 2002, twelve European Union members traded in their individual
currencies for the Euro (€), the new common currency of the EU. The new currency propelled
nations into a geographic and economic partnership known as the Eurozone. By agreement, the
United Kingdom and Denmark are the only nations in the EU exempt from adopting the Euro.
All other members must enter the Eurozone after meeting certain economic criterion.
Though not legally obligated, the United Kingdom was initially scheduled to make the
transition to the Euro around 2003, shortly after the first twelve states had done so. However, the
process abruptly stalled as a robust debate erupted across the country. Once again, it was a
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conflict between European integration and British nationalism. Reasoning aside, the debate was
ultimately won by nationalists as the UK voted to keep the pound sterling. This decision, further
analyzed below, seems to have primarily stemmed from economic analyses and pressure from
persuasive British leadership.
In the early 2000s, the Euro’s value was weak against both the pound sterling and the US
dollar. Its relative performance did not come close to competing against currencies tied to the
UK and US economies.94 However, by the summer of 2002, its value against the US dollar
picked up, but even with the euro’s increase in value, unemployment in the Eurozone,
specifically in the powerhouse state Germany, remained extremely high.95
EU advocates in the UK recognized significant benefits associated with membership in
the Eurozone, but nationalists saw these reasons as too complex and restrictive of their
sovereignty. One currency meant that there were no longer separate national monetary policies,
and instead, a new central bank, the European Central Bank (ECB). The ECB is charged with
providing a Europe-wide monetary policy, keeping interest and exchange rates consistent and
helping control inflation.96
There thus were benefits to Eurozone membership, but also sacrifices member states had
to make. The most notable of these was that all economic policies would henceforth come from
the ECB and could no longer be made at home. This meant that if Germany, for example,
wanted to introduce an economic policy to combat its high unemployment rate, it would not be
able to decide this matter as a sovereign nation. The policy could only come from the ECB.97
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When the idea of the Eurozone started gaining momentum in the late 1990s, UK Prime
Minister Tony Blair promised to join the Eurozone if a referendum showed a majority of the
nation favored membership. Blair and Home Secretary Jack Straw, who were both strong
proponents of EU integration, commissioned an opinion poll in 1997 to gauge whether the UK
would vote to adopt the Euro. The results showed that 60% of the British population favored
keeping the pound. 98 Based on these results, Alastair Campbell, political aide to Tony Blair,
advised caution in issuing a referendum. This was not the result Blair and Straw were hoping for,
and Campbell recommended waiting to hold a referendum until more people favored the Euro.
A year later, the Prime Minister’s office commissioned another poll and achieved in roughly the
same result.99 Blair waited another year and ran a third poll, only to get the same result again –
that a majority of the British population wanted to keep the pound.
After three years, Blair grew tired of waiting and decided a big change was needed to
influence public opinion. He helped launch the largest bi-partisan British campaign ever, in favor
of adopting the Euro, called “Britain in Europe.”100 This campaign was heavily funded and
supported by many in the government. Soon after its launch, a rival campaign flourished called
“Business for Sterling”101, that was aimed at keeping the pound sterling. ‘Business for Sterling’
was supported by prominent former Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher and received funds from
ordinary people all throughout the country. Almost as quickly as it began, the nationalist
campaign matched ‘Britain in Europe’ in funds and stature. Again, these two opposing sides
were leaving the nation split between European integration and national identity.
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Ed Balls, Chief Economic Advisor to the Treasury, did not share Blair’s urgency to vote
on the matter and publicly stated there more pressing issues than the Eurozone. Chancellor
Gordon Brown then stepped in and disagreed, stating the matter should indeed be decided
immediately. Brown thus created the so-called ‘Five-Test Policy’ to settle the debate.102 The
‘Five Test Policy’ stated if the United Kingdom passed five different tests, they would join the
Eurozone. If they did not pass all five, it meant they weren’t ready would keep the pound
sterling for the time being.
Prime Minister Blair publicly dismissed the tests because of his perception of their bias,
stating they were heavily structured to favor the pound sterling. In his view, these tests as
written would not produce a fair assessment of Britain’s compatibility with the Eurozone. He
further restated his position that the United Kingdom should join the Eurozone for critical policy
reasons. Blair and others believed that the five economic tests as constructed set benchmarks so
difficult to satisfy that a movement to the Euro could never be justified.103
Ultimately, a Treasury analysis provided Brown a strong enough arsenal to fend of the
less-than-enthusiastic Blair, and so the five-test policy was carried out. The five tests conducted
were as follows:104
1. Are business cycles and economic structures compatible so that we and others could
live with euro interest rates on a permanent basis?
2. If problems emerge, is there sufficient flexibility to deal with them?
3. Would joining the European Monetary Union (EMU) create better conditions for firms
making long term decisions to invest in Britain?
4. What impact would entry into EMU have on the financial services industry?
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5. In summary, will joining EMU promote higher growth, stability, and a lasting increase
in jobs?
These tests were meant to examine whether the European system produced enough
flexibility for Britain to deal with their own economic problems, a matter important to many.
They also assessed the impact on London, the nation’s financial sector, as London needed to
remain in a competitive position internationally. In short, adoption of the Euro had much to
prove - namely that it would promote employment growth, enhance stability, increase jobs, and
keep interest rates compatible and steady.105
Unsurprising to Blair and others who had dismissed the tests from the beginning, four out
of five tests failed, with the only one passing being the fourth, which was aimed at keeping
London competitive in the financial services industry. Pro-Euro cabinet members like Charles
Clarke and Patricia Hewitt complained that the decision had been pre-ordained, but given that
the tests had already been conducted, it was too late.106 So as simple as that, Euro membership
was off the agenda for the foreseeable future and a referendum was not held.
Identity & Institution Analysis
Chancellor Brown and the nationalists had an entire arsenal of reasons the UK should
not, and did not, join the Eurozone in addition to the five-test policy. These reasons seem to fall
into three primary categories. First, the British desire for independence and sovereignty did not
align with the Eurozone. Second, the British people were reluctant to change. Third, the UK
economy was more westernized than the rest of Europe, causing the two to diverge on a number
of financial matters.
The British desire for sovereignty justified keeping the pound because the British
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populace did not want to abdicate control of their own interest rate policies. As previously stated,
Euro interest rates are set by the European Central Bank, and thus were not necessarily suitable
for the UK. The ECB is responsible for the entire Euro economy, not just one member when
setting rates. The way they set rates would cause British interest rates to fall from 5.52% to
2.25%, resulting in inflationary pressures. 107
Also, under the ECB, the UK would also be forced to meet Euro convergence data,
including maintaining a debt-to-GDP ratio that limited British fiscal policy. With the Euro, the
UK economy faced the prospect of being severely impacted if the British needed to avoid or
recover from a recession. The Bank of England also could no longer act as a lender of last resort,
buying bonds during a temporary shortfall. Bond markets would thus become much more
uncertain and require higher bond yields to compensate for their increased risk.108 Furthermore,
homeowners in the UK are already extremely sensitive to change, with their mortgage payments
already higher percentages of their income than in many parts of the developed world, including
the US. In summary, the British reluctance to change is arguably just as deeply rooted as their
desire for sovereignty, and the Eurozone system would remove significant features of that
sovereignty.
Finally, the British economy has been more westernized than the rest of Europe. They
were at a different stage in the trade cycle than the rest of the Eurozone at the turn of the century
because their economy had been growing much faster. The UK thus had a lower unemployment
rate than the rest of the Eurozone and greater export flexibility. Put simply, the British economy
did not need the Euro. The differences in the two systems had the potential to cause more harm
than benefit.
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Brown and the nationalists’ arguments were only a viable option as the Eurozone did not
provide enough benefit to compensate for the risk. The nationalists also emphasized the
sociological institutionalist theory through the arguments that the two systems did not align. The
Brits did not comply with the same norms or rules as the rest of Europe and had a more
westernized economy. Thus, the transition would have been difficult.
Brown’s position was not shared by all, however, given that Blair and other European
Union advocates supported the Eurozone. “Britain in Europe” argued two main points in favor
of Eurozone membership - increased stability and overall gains. The argument for increased
stability capitalized on exchange rate stability. Trade would become easier with other nations and
would not fluctuate as other economies waivered. In the early 2000s, low inflation characterized
the Eurozone. There was a time in history in which the United Kingdom was known as the ‘sick
man of Europe’, as its economy was characterized by boom and bust cycles and high inflation.
Blair and other European advocates argued that the Eurozone would provide a strong, safe
framework to prevent another crash in their economy.
These EU advocates claimed joining the Eurozone would not only increase stability but
also give the UK an advantage in terms of lower transaction costs and trade amongst other
members – overall gains. The increased cooperation would bring greater opportunities and
inward investment, or investment into the UK from sister EU nations. They were optimistic their
economy would soar within the Eurozone.
Ultimately, the majority of British people believed the potential benefits of the Euro were
outweighed by the costs, proving the sense of nationalism was stronger than the desire to
integrate. By weighing the potential benefits, and sociological institutionalism pointing out the
cultural differences, the decision to keep the pound was clearly won by this nationalist sect in the
UK, the same side that ultimately voted to withdraw from the EU in 2016 as well.
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Correlation to Brexit
The reasoning behind keeping the pound sterling showed indicators that the UK was not
fully integrated into the EU. Retaining the pound sterling also showed strength in the identity
side, demonstrating British nationalism was too strong to fully integrate. The decision to keep the
pound further signaled that majority of the Brits did not wish to accept the norms or rules of the
Eurozone community, causing them to stray in terms of sociological institutionalism.
The British also have clearly shown a desire for sovereignty and distaste for restraints
imposed by the ECB. Instead, they demonstrated they have always wanted to self-govern. They
demonstrated a reluctance to change and deep roots in their home ways. They further proved the
differences between their nation and the rest of Europe in more ways than meet the eye.
These main points argued by the nationalists in 2003 carried over to the 2016 referendum
and decision to withdraw from the EU. Sociological institutionalist theories show the lack of
shared beliefs. In addition, the decision to not adopt the Euro and keep the pound made
withdrawing from the European Union much simpler. If France, for example, were to withdraw
they would need to re-create and reinstate a whole new currency system. Without the Euro, it
was much easier for the United Kingdom to leave than other Eurozone nations.
2005-2015: National security policies in the United Kingdom intensify
“The partnership with the United States is our most important bilateral relationship and
central to our national security.”
– Parliament’s 2008 National Security Strategy for the United Kingdom109
Overview
In 2005, David Cameron was elected Prime Minister of the United Kingdom running on a
platform to ‘Stop Banging on about Europe!’. Cameron wasn’t necessarily a Euroskeptic, his
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priorities just focused more on issues within the United Kingdom. More specifically, with the
election of Cameron coming shortly after the 9/11 terrorist attacks in the United States, the
United Kingdom concentrated on reforming its national security policy.
National security discussions in Parliament became more frequent and counterterrorism
methods increased. As a result, budgeting skyrocketed. In 2001, the UK allotted approximately
£1 billion to national security, but by 2008 they raised that number to £2.5 billion. By 2010,
financing increased to £3.5 billion and by 2020-2021, national security costs are projected to be
£4.7 billion.110
National security has evolved in the 21st century with burgeoning technology and the new
world of cyber warfare. These momentous new national security issues and their accompanying
budget provoked reservations about EU policies in the UK. Specifically, four major items
became points of contention - the Schengen Zone, terrorism, the migration crisis, and the
European Court of Justice (ECJ).
The Schengen Zone is the first area of disconnect regarding security between the UK and
the EU, though it existed long before Cameron came into power and Britain’s national security
policies evolved. The agreement, first signed in Schengen, Luxembourg, in 1985, abolished
many of the EU’s internal borders enabling passport-free movement between member states. It
fully took effect in 1990 in Belgium, France, Germany, Luxembourg, and the Netherlands.111
Other countries quickly followed. Currently, there are 26 Schengen countries; 22 are EU
members and four are not: Iceland, Norway, Switzerland, and Liechtenstein. Only six of the 28
EU member states are outside the Schengen Zone. Bulgaria, Croatia, Cyprus, and Romania have
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yet to be admitted, while the UK and Republic of Ireland have declined to participate. The UK
and Ireland have been insistent on maintaining its own borders since 1990.
The Schengen Zone is often criticized by Euroskeptics who say ‘it is an open door for
criminals and migrants’112, which leads to the second point of contention – terrorism. The 2015
terrorist attacks in Paris that killed 130 people prompted an urgent evaluation of the Schengen
agreement. Citizens and government leaders alike were alarmed by how easily the killers
slipped into Paris and how easily they escaped. The European Commission was under immense
pressure to reinstate temporary border controls, and emergency meetings were held to discuss
such implementation.113
Many believe the terrorists in Paris entered the EU with crowds of migrants via Greece,
which brings the third primary disconnect between the UK and the EU – the migrant crisis. In
2015, more than a million migrants, many of them Syrian refugees, heightened pressure on the
EU to reinstate temporary border controls. Tensions between EU member states regarding the
surge of immigrants coming from the Middle East and Africa remains high.114
In the past two and a half years, the UK has accepted more than 10,000 Syrian
refugees.115 Eastern European and other Middle Eastern immigrants are common as well. In the
Financial Times, Economics Editor Chris Giles provided charts expressing the impact of
immigration on the UK. “Migrants from eastern European countries that joined the EU after
2004 are more likely to be working than any other group in Britain.”116 This statistic angered
many British citizens, who thought it meant migrants were taking their jobs. Giles included a
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statement saying, “There is no evidence that European migrants came to live a life on benefits or
took jobs from Brits.”117
Giles further goes on to discuss crime, as it is regularly correlated with migration in the
UK. “Though crime rates have fallen in the years immigration has risen, there are still concerns
that migrants are disproportionately responsible.”118 This brings us to the fourth and final major
development in the EU that angered British citizens and officials – the European Court of
Justice.
In 2009, the Lisbon Treaty was signed making ‘The Court of Justice of the European
Union’, or the ECJ, the EU’s highest legal authority. The ECJ interprets and enforces rules of the
single market, settle disputes between member countries, and is the supreme court tasked with
interpreting EU law.119 As a result, the ECJ restricts British influence and reduces the authority
of the British judiciary. Thus, the vast majority of British citizens view it with resentment and
hostility.
Once in office, Prime Minister Cameron responded to the Lisbon Treaty in outrage,
promising to renegotiate British terms in the European Union if any future treaty transfers power
from the UK to the EU. The Brits responded by expressing a strong desire for their laws to be
made by Parliament, not a foreign court. Brexit Secretary David Davis compared ECJ
governance to Britain’s national sport of football when he told BBC “If Manchester United goes
to play Real Madrid, they don’t allow Real Madrid to nominate the referee. It needs to be a joint
agreement.”120
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The UK’s particularly strong aversion to the ECJ could stem from the fact that its
overriding control makes it difficult for British politicians to rule on international matters, such
as the deportation of terrorists. However, the objection could also be because many in the UK
want full control/sovereignty and do not trust the ECJ making decisions for them. ECJ judgments
are not always clear. According to Catherine Barnard, Professor of European Law at Cambridge,
“Because the ECJ was written in one language which is translated into 23, and they can only give
a single judgment, it is inevitably a compromise.”121
The fact the UK operates under a common law system is another complicating factor, as
the UK governs differently than any other member state. Most EU countries have civil law
systems, meaning they follow more formal, codified laws. British law, on the other hand, is not
codified. Countries with common law systems are developed by judges who apply statute, set
precedent, and determine law on a case-by-case basis.122 The ECJ is tailored more for civil law
systems though, as it is used by a vast majority of their member states. The EU member states
that utilize civil versus common law, and the original influences of their legal systems, are
depicted below in Table 4.123
Table 4 – EU Member States, Primary Legal System, & Description of Influences
EU Member
Austria
Belgium
Bulgaria
Croatia
Cyprus
Czech Republic
Denmark
Estonia
Finland

Legal System
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil

Original Influence
Based on Germanic Civil law
A heavily modified version of the Napoleonic Code
Based on Germanic and Roman systems
Based on Germanic and Austrian systems
Based on Germanic Civil law
Based on Germanic Civil law
Based on Nordic law
Based on Germanic Civil law
Based on Nordic law
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France
Germany
Greece
Hungary

Civil
Civil
Civil
Civil

Based on Napoleonic Code
Influenced by Roman and German law
Based on Germanic civil law
Based on Germanic and Roman systems with elements
of the Napoleonic Code
Ireland
Common
Based on English Common Law
Italy
Civil
Based on Germanic Civil law with elements of the
Napoleonic Code
Latvia
Civil
Based on Germanic Civil law and the Napoleonic Code
Lithuania
Civil
Based on Dutch Civil law
Luxembourg
Civil
Based on Napoleonic Code
Malta
Civil & Common Merges Napoleonic Code, English Common Law, and
Italian Civil Law
Netherlands
Civil
Based on Napoleonic Code with German influence
Poland
Civil
Independent Polish Civil Code
Portugal
Civil
Influenced by Napoleonic Code and later by German
Civil Law
Romania
Civil
Based on Civil Code of Quebec and Napoleonic Code
Slovakia
Civil
Based on Austrian Empire Civil Code
Slovenia
Civil
Based on Germanic and Austro-Hungarian law systems
Spain
Civil
Merges both Napoleonic Code and Castilian Traditions
Sweden
Civil
Based on Nordic Law
United Kingdom Common
Primarily developed in the Middle Ages
The governance of the ECJ has highlighted these differences and deepened British angst.
After 2005, British leaders began looking at more global institutions and IGO’s outside of the
European Union. This outward-looking view is demonstrated in the UK’s national security
report.
Every year, the British cabinet produces a report addressing important matters like the
Schengen Zone, migrant crisis, terrorism, or European Court of Justice. In 2008, the report
specifically addressed globalization. As globalization in the world increased, the UK’s national
security policy stated they needed to adjust accordingly. “The UK follows a multilateral, rulesbased approach led by international institutions”, the report cites. “Just as globalisation
exacerbates the challenges, it also creates new opportunities for multilateral response, using
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trading, political, social, and cultural links to build wider cooperation.”124 This 2008 report is an
indication that the UK was starting to look beyond the European Union.
In 2018, a national security brief was again issued by Parliament, but this time under
completely new circumstances post-Brexit. “We are an open, outward-looking, tolerant
European country that celebrates our history and diversity, confident of our place in the world,
meeting our obligations to our near neighbors and far off friends, and proud to stand up for our
values.” Prime Minister Theresa May said. “I am confident that we can rise to the challenges
ahead and that we can build on our considerable strengths to enhance our national security.”125
While the 2018 report was primarily introspective, May and the Cabinet still discussed
how Europe’s security and the United Kingdom’s security are heavily intertwined. “Europe’s
security is our security,” May said, confirming the decision to leave the EU does not alter the
British commitment to improved security.126
Identity & Institutional Analysis
The four points discussed above are interconnected and share the battle of identity versus
institution. The fact that many British citizens do not like the ECJ stems from the strong sense of
nationalism in the UK. While a plethora of reasons are listed above, another not to be forgotten is
simple – the ECJ has ‘Europe’ in the title. In the United Kingdom, British citizenship is more
valued than European identity. The majority of British citizens have strong independence and
desire for separation of Europe, demonstrated through their distinct history, individual way of
thinking, and the results of the Moreno test described previously. After the 2016 Brexit
referendum and early in Theresa May’s negotiations to leave the EU, she made departure from
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the ECJ a compulsory condition.127 The United Kingdom citizenry had a strong desire to govern
themselves outside of external control.
When the migrant crisis began, the EU welcomed the refugees and placed them
throughout their member states. The United Kingdom was less than thrilled, but under the
governing jurisdiction of the ECJ, the matter was out of their control. The number of migrants
worldwide exploded over 200% between 1960 and 2015128, and resentment for the lack of input
and decision making in that crisis grew to unprecedented levels.
In terms of sociological institutionalism, the UK never fully accepted the norms or ideas
of the European Union. The UK had a different legal system, utilizing common law instead of
civil law, making the decisions of the ECJ less transferrable. The UK also refused to join the
Schengen Zone and insisted on maintaining their own borders. The EU also had different policy
goals than the United Kingdom and had a different legal system. The UK was also interested in
looking globally for primary alliances, unlike much Europe.
As globalization increased, the UK saw doors open with the rest of the world.
Cooperation and trade agreements with one’s neighbors were no longer a necessary part of
society, as technology had increased and made worldwide communication instantaneous. In
terms of GDP per capita and population, the five top-ranking world powers in order are the
United States, Russia, China, Germany, and then the United Kingdom. If extended to the top ten
world powers, the only European states that made the cut are Germany, France, and the United
Kingdom.129 If Britain wanted to remain a top world power, they recognized cooperation with
the other 7 of the top world powers was necessary. The world was more powerful than Europe
alone, explaining why Britain began looking further outward.
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Correlation to Brexit
The shift in policy starting around 2005 is a predictor of the 2016 decision to withdraw
from the EU. In 2008, Parliament hinted they were looking beyond the European Union when it
came to trade, politics, and cooperation. Also, in 2008, they discussed the trend of globalization
and how Britain would adapt to the changing world – a foreshadowing sign of their withdrawal
soon to come.
The points of contention regarding security between the United Kingdom and the
European Union reflect a long-expressed dissatisfaction with EU policies. The UK didn’t like
being controlled by the ECJ, they didn’t join the Schengen Zone, and the migrant crisis was
bringing the negatives of EU membership to the forefront. These items, while significant
separately, combined to nullify the positives of membership.
2016: The United Kingdom votes to leave the EU
“2016 was the end of the world as we know it…” – The Guardian, December 25, 2016
Overview
In 2016, the battle between identity and institution came to across its largest hurdle yet –
the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union. Though the vote to leave was in
June of 2016, membership began rapidly deteriorating in 2013, when Prime Minister David
Cameron first proposed a referendum. Cameron thought attaining better membership terms for
the UK would improve his chances at the ballot box and reconcile factions within his political
party. He was confident the referendum would just lead to better terms and conditions for Great
Britain’s membership in the EU. Cameron never intended to leave, but this gamble proved to be
an immense miscalculation. The series of events beginning in 1945 set in motion the 2016
decision to withdraw, although a few short-term events were also significant contributing factors.
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In the historic 2013 Bloomberg Speech, Cameron acknowledged multiple problems with
the UK’s EU membership. He promised that if he were to win the 2015 Prime Minister election,
he would meet with EU leaders to renegotiate the terms of membership. Following said
negotiations, Cameron promised he would let the British citizenry decide whether or not they
wanted to remain in the EU.
With that campaign promise resonating, Cameron won swiftly, and he immediately
commenced EU negotiations. The discussions lasted only a few months, during the winter of
2015, which put the United Kingdom 18 months ahead of Cameron’s intended negotiation
schedule. George Osborne, the British Finance Minister, expressed concern with the time table
and urged Cameron to extend the negotiations for more time. Cameron denied Osborne’s
recommendation and proceeded anyway, scheduling the referendum for June 23, 2016.
Cameron’s negotiations with the European Union produced only minor, cosmetic
changes to British membership terms, meaning the referendum would be voted on mostly the
status quo. Osborne deeply feared this and took over negotiations. George Osborne was known
for being ruthless, cunning, and clever. And that’s exactly the manner in which he approached
the referendum. He decided with the short time in which to work and not much to show for new
terms as a result of the negotiation, the best way to ensure Britain stayed a member state of the
European Union was to make them scared of what life would be like outside the protection of the
EU, better known as ‘Project Fear’. ‘Project Fear’ was not the first-time Osborne used a scare
tactic to influence a vote. This method worked flawlessly in Scotland in 2014, when Scotland
tried to secede from the United Kingdom. However, Project Fear did not yield the same results in
2016.
Cameron’s role in the British referendum was significant. The vote arguably wouldn’t
have happened without his persistence and significant miscalculation of time needed to secure
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better EU terms. However, the results of the referendum weren’t entirely due to Cameron. The
outcome wasn’t what he intended or even desired. Various social, economic, and political factors
and the rise of British nationalism contributed to the majority of citizens in the United Kingdom
voting to leave.
The leave campaign was composed primarily of the UK Independence Party (UKIP), a
political party that had been campaigning for Britain’s exit from the EU for years. In 2016,
UKIP was joined by roughly half of the Conservative Party, including leaders Boris Johnson and
five other Cabinet members.130 A handful of Labour Members in Parliament (MP’s) and the
Northern Ireland Party were also in favor of leaving.
These citizens favored independence from the EU for many reasons. Namely because the
EU was growing in power. The EU imposed dozens of rules on British businesses and charged
billions of pounds each year in membership fees with little coming back to the UK. The Brexit
proponents wanted the UK to make their own laws again, rather than have laws created for them
through shared decision-making in the EU. They wanted to take back control of Britain’s
borders and reduce the number of people migrating to the UK, per EU mandate.
The other side, hoping to remain in the European Union, was led by Prime Minister
Cameron. Sixteen members of his cabinet, including current Prime Minister Teresa May, backed
staying in. While the Conservative Party was split on the issue and officially remained neutral,
the Labour Party, Scottish National Party, Plaid Cymru, Green Party, and Liberal Democrats all
favored remaining. Big businesses also favored remaining, as membership made it easier for
them to earn, transfer money, and trade products around the world. The biggest argument the
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stay campaign made was that Britain’s status would be damaged if they were to leave. “We are
more secure as part of the 28-nation club, rather than going at it alone,” Hunt said.131
Ultimately, these two sides battled against one another in a fierce quick campaign. The
‘Leave’ campaign ended up winning the election by narrow margins, making the decision to
leave the EU official. After the vote was decided, David Cameron immediately stepped down as
Prime Minister, stating he cannot negotiate a decision he doesn’t believe in. Shortly thereafter,
Theresa May was elected Prime Minister and began the Article 50 negotiations to leave the
European Union. The United Kingdom is scheduled to make the official departure on March 29,
2019.
Identity & Institutional Analysis
2016 left the world in uncertainty, from the British referendum to the American election
of President Donald Trump. “The twin political earthquakes of 2016 were widely perceived as a
revolt against globalization and a call for strengthening national sovereignty.” US State
Department official Anne-Marie Slaughter said.132 Citizens in many parts of the world began
reacting against globalization in the name of what appeared to be deeply emotional ties to their
culture and country. “People want to take their country back,” President Trump said in Scotland
after Brexit in 2016, “They want to have independence in a sense.”133
In the 21st century, nationalist movements shifted away from vocal minorities toward
demographic classes. Economic stagnation in the lower and middle classes made citizens feel
like their country was being taken away. They rose up to take control of their identity. “This will
be a victory for the real people, a victory for the ordinary people.” Nigel Farage, head of UKIP,
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said in his Brexit victory speech. 134 “People are not voting according to how well off they want
the country to be, or even how well off they want to be, but how big they want to feel… Politics
in 2016 was about status.” said author and journalist Ian Leslie.135
Nationalist identity, with an ironic outward-looking global dimension, swept over both
the world and the UK in 2016, but it hit the UK a lot harder than elsewhere. The sharp influx of
nationalism, combined with various short-term causes promoted by Cameron and political
leaders, in addition to historical sticking points made the UK vote to leave. Ease came to the
United Kingdom that other nations didn’t have; they withheld from joining the Eurozone and
Schengen Zone. With strong nationalism and weakening institutionalism defining the leave and
remain campaigns, respectively, it’s no surprise the result of the vote to leave was successful.
Overall Analysis
The United Kingdom first threatened to withdraw in 1975, just after they had joined the
European Economic Community. States often threaten to leave as a negotiation strategy, and in
1975, this worked for the UK. Britain struck a favorable deal by nearly walking away from the
EEC, but the same result did not occur in 2016. The 2016 Brexit threat was not enough to garner
the EU reforms the UK wanted.
The United Kingdom decision to withdraw from the EU can be best explained through
the three historical events described previously and two types of institutionalism – sociological
institutionalism, and historical institutionalism. The differences in culture bring back the point
of sociological institutionalism – the UK was never fully socialized in the EU, dating back to its
initial application for membership in the 1960s. The UK has always been more westernized than
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the rest of Europe, Charles de Gaulle saw it back in the 1960s and many observed it in the 21st
century as well.
The United Kingdom is an island, isolated from the rest of Europe, sharing borders only
with the sea. They are isolated by geography, but showed isolation on an even deeper level, as
the UK constantly negotiated with the EU trying to get better terms and conditions. They showed
isolation even further as they voted to keep the pound and declined to join the Schengen Zone,
opting to protect their own borders and making it easier to withdraw. The UK was a member of
Europe, but they valued state sovereignty and country pride more than European membership.
Historical institutionalists pointed out that institutions evolve over time. When the United
Kingdom joined the European Community, their missions aligned and the two mutually
benefitted from cooperation. The UK needed help financially, wanted more protection from a
security standpoint, and EU membership offered them the deepest benefits with the most
efficiency. But the world has changed immensely since the conception of the European
Community. As security changed and the EU gained more power, differences in their legal
systems became more prominent, technology made communication more universal, and
economic circumstances evolved, causing interests to diverge.
In 2016, two important things happened; nostalgic nationalism sharply increased and the
institutional aspects of the European Union were viewed as more restrictive than beneficial.
These factors led many to desire independence. States are constantly looking to maximize
situations to their own advantage. Sometimes that is cooperation, and that meant membership in
the European Union for the United Kingdom in much of the 20th Century. However, in 2016, the
majority of British citizens decided the maximum benefits for the UK were not going to be
achieved as an EU member state and thus, they voted in support of Brexit.
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Conclusion
“We have our own dream and our own task. We are with Europe, but not of it. We are
linked but not combined. We are interested and associated but not absorbed. If Britain
must choose between Europe and the open sea, she must always choose the open sea.”
– Winston Churchill, House of Commons, 1953
In 1961, international theorist Ernest Haas analyzed European integration as it emerged
on the scene. “Regional blocs had the potential to be ‘islands of cooperation’ that might build a
bridge toward universal peace.” He said.136 Haas looked at the puzzle and the implications of
European integration, wondering if it would be imitated and generate transnational spillovers in
other states. For decades, the answer seemed to be yes, and it looked like the world was on an
unstoppable march toward integration. Multinational corporations and new technologies
advanced and knit together countries across the world. However, that global, cooperative
approach has since slowed.
The 2016 election of Donald Trump, the changes in Chinese policy, Brexit, and the
current wave of authoritarian populist challenges have brought increased attention to countries
withdrawing from international organizations. While the United Kingdom is the first to leave the
EU, member-state withdrawals from IGO’s have been happening since WWII.
There have been approximately 200 withdrawals from international organizations since
1945, per Inkin Von Borzykowski and Felicity Vabulus, political scientists. In 1970, Honduras
left the Central American Common Market (SICA). In 2000, Tanzania exited the Common
Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA). In 2008, Uzbekistan decided to leave the
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Eurasian Economic Community (EAEC).137 Though there have been over 200 of these
withdrawals, we know very little about their effects.
Von Borzykowski and Vabulus argue consequences depend on the state, as different
states face different withdrawal processes and are intertwined to different levels. They argue
states will face political costs, as international investors and analysts may adjudicate the states
retreat negatively, as they have reneged on an international commitment. Economic costs are
also a factor but are unlikely to be too destructive financially, as states surely do a cost-benefit
analysis before exiting.138 However, the more institutionalized the IGO is, the higher the costs
states are likely to pay.
Brexit is a unique case because of its large scale - The United Kingdom is the world’s 5th
largest economy and they voted to leave the world’s most interdependent union. States in the EU
lean on the highly structured and institutionalized aspect of the IGO to balance their differences,
increasing their sociological reliance. Sharing norms, standards, and aspects of their independent
cultures lower the probability of conflict by essentially tying member states hands together. The
increase of independent identity and nationalism challenged this sociological institutionalism of
the EU for the United Kingdom.
The 2016 referendum introduced a totally new political dynamic into Europe that is still
playing out and impossible to predict. British expected growth in 2018 was predicted to decline
from 2.1% to 1.6%.139 The United Kingdom was expected to experience more debt, have fewer
jobs, and tighten their migration policies, but it’s hard to say what the consequences will actually
be until the departure is official in March of 2019. Whether there will be imitators or
transnational spillovers cannot yet be known. Withdrawals are not homogeneous, as the IGO
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membership or states in question differentiate greatly. However, an in-depth analysis studying
the relationship of identity and institution in each member state could predict their likelihood to
stay or leave.
The United Kingdom has had a rocky relationship with the EU since its conception, they
were never fully socialized into the EU, and they had challenges with the institutional framework
laid out for them. The value they place on Britishness and national identity conflicted with their
international membership from the beginning as well. All of these points are proven by the case
studies above and ultimately, all of these factors led to the decision to withdraw in 2016.
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